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1. Introduction 
The topic of innovation has garnered the interest since the seminal work by 
Schumpeter (1942), probably because it constitutes the main source of economic 
growth. However, until the advent of panel data sets, there was little empirical 
evidence to link the innovative stance and the performance of the firms. Recent work 
that uses panel databases on firms has demonstrated the importance of innovation to 
growth in firms, then translated to economic growth.1 Our main interest in this study is 
not connected with the link between innovation and growth but we are interested in 
analysing the factors that condition whether a firm adopts an innovation policy. Not all 
firms successfully innovate despite the benefits of doing so. The advent of innovation 
surveys that collect data on a variety of firm characteristics provides us with the 
opportunity to study the differences between firms that innovate and those that do not 
innovate.2 
More specifically, our first and main concern is the investigation of the 
complementarities between the decisions to carry out both product and process 
innovations. According to this, we consider that the traditional measures of R&D 
activities (expenditures, patents, employment in R&D) do not properly capture real 
decisions. So, we will use information of both product and process innovations 
following a new strand of research (Arrow, 1962; Yi, 2001). From a strategic point of 
view, managers decide about the implementation of a better innovation policy in order 
to obtain a better position of a company. They decide to introduce a new product or a 
new production process, to enter a new market or to change the organization 
structure of a firm. It implies that such decisions form part of the firm innovation 
activity and the reasons to carry out one or another are different, so it is then possible 
that innovation should not be treated as a homogeneous activity. 
This study uses the resource-based view (RBV) to study the complemantarity 
among the innovation decisions. Many analysis have concentrated in the 
complementarities among business strategies (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999); 
however little has been done about complementarities among innovation decisions. 
The RBV also serves us to test whether the heterogeneity of the firm is due also to 
the different forms to monitor the firm. This objective is difficult to pursue since data 
available does not directly provide with such information, although it is still possible to 
use some statistical instruments to control and estimate the effects of manager’s 
                                                        
1 See for instance Baldwin (1998). 
2 Seen for instance Sterlacchini (1994) for Italy and Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1996) for Holland. 
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decisions on the innovation decisions inside firms. In addition to identify the main 
determinants of innovation, we test whether product and process decisions are 
independent of each other or are complementary activities within the firms. 
A second point is to separate the experience effect of the firm (capacities, 
routines as organization) from the experience effect of the manager (skills, abilities); 
because we argue that managers have more incentives to develop innovation 
activities that translate into visible results –product innovations- than to focus on 
efficiency policies –process innovations-. This objective is not easy because we do 
not have observable information about the experience of the manager in taking 
decisions of innovation activity. So, we assume that the manager’s experience is a 
fixed effect and it could be correlated with the decision to carry out one or another 
innovation activity. On the other hand, the experience of the firm will be approximated 
both by industry effects and past innovations. Whether or not there exists association 
between both variables would be also a purpose of this paper although we are aware 
of the difficulty in isolating those effects. 
However, the paper has some interested and related goals. The third aim 
involves the usually known as the Schumpeterian hypotheses about the extent to 
which size of a firm and competition in the industry environment stimulate innovation. 
It is sometimes claimed that innovation is fostered by a climate where firms are large 
or in industries where there is less competition. While Arrow (1962) made a claim 
contrary to Schumpeter (1942), there is mixed evidence that either matter (Scherer, 
1992). Because of its importance, this issue continues to receive attention (Cohen 
and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b using US data or Martínez-Ros and Labeaga, 2001 using 
Spanish data). We are also worried about the effect of the owning of firms in the 
innovation regime of Spain. Several authors have stressed the special role of the 
multinational firm in transferring special innovation skills from one nation state to 
another.  
In order to test those hypotheses we use data at firm level corresponding to 
approximately 1000 Spanish manufacturing firms along the period 1990-1999. The 
database is provided by the Spanish Industry and Energy Ministry and involves 
approximately 2500 firms belonging to the manufacturing sector each period. The 
sample we use consists in an unbalanced panel that allows us to keep 
representativeness of the sample as well as to fully exploit the dynamic nature of the 
model. Before estimating the model, we conduct an extensive descriptive analysis in 
which we try to emphasize whether past can explain current decisions, computing 
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frequencies conditional on past frequencies but unconditional on other regressors. 
There are several alternatives to estimate the model. Previous empirical 
evidence on this issue is mainly based on the estimation of univariate probit, count 
data or two-part models (see Martínez-Ros, 2000 and Martínez-Ros and Labeaga, 
2002). We try in this paper all kind of discrete choice models in an attempt to 
individually and jointly test all the proposed hypotheses. Since a fundamental issue to 
explain unobserved differences in firms’ behaviour is the control of unobserved 
heterogeneity (Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen, 1995), we specially focus in 
controlling unobserved individual heterogeneity. In this sense, we take account of firm 
effects (manager’s experience or ability) possibly correlated with some conditioning 
variables (past innovation firm’s experience) using recent estimation proposals (see, 
for instance, Arellano and Carrasco, 1996 and Bover and Arellano, 1997). 
Among the main findings we find complementary but asymmetric effects 
concerning both decisions in static models even controlling correlated heterogeneity. 
However, once we include experience in the own innovation decision, the significance 
of the other innovation indicator vanishes. The cross effects amongst the two 
decisions can be considered both correlated heterogeneity or spurious dependence in 
static specifications, but they can be due to spurious dependence once correlated 
heterogeneity has been controlled for. This results points towards doing innovation in 
the past as the main determinants of conducting contemporary innovation activities 
(i.e., firm effects). Other interesting result refers to the degree of vertical integration of 
a firm. When, we control by the experience and heterogeneity, we obtain significance 
and the expected effects of this variable on innovations decisions. We confirm our 
main hypotheses: large firms with higher technological opportunities in the market that 
dedicate big investments in physical capital find more profitable to carry out 
innovations in new processes than in new products. That is, the internal resources of 
a company follows being important even controlling by ability and persistance in 
innovating. 
The rest of the paper contains four sections. In section 2 we motivate the 
paper and justify the specification used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 a 
description of the model is made. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical analysis and 
discussion of results. We summarise the main findings and provide some conclusions 
in section 5. 
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2. Innovation as a heterogeneous activity 
 The definition of innovation is wide because it includes the introduction of a 
new product or service, improvements or changes in the production process, materials 
and intermediate inputs and management methods. An issue arises with the 
possibility of some kind of these innovations are in some way related, in particular, the 
introduction of new products and the use of new designs and procedures to 
manufacture products. We are interested in addressing whether companies have 
some degree of discretion in the decision to carry out innovation in products or/and 
innovation in process. As Milgrom and Roberts (1990) pointed out, product and 
process are complements because they mutually reinforce through increases of the 
level of any of them leads to increases of the marginal profitability of the other.  
In the literature, there no exists much evidence that investigates the relations 
among product and process innovations. A few attempts have been made Lunn, 
(1986), and Kraft (1990) have considered the possibility that innovation activity could 
be divided into different types attending to its final purpose. Recent papers (Fritsch 
and Meschede, 2001; Flaig and Stadler, 1998) found that both activities are related, 
implementation of a product innovation can make corresponding process innovation 
necessary, while process innovation may enable a firm to considerably improve the 
quality of its products or to produce completely new products. Bonano and Haworth 
(1998) included vertically differentiated product innovations and Rosenkranz (1995) 
assumed horizontally differentiated product innovations. Both articles try to fill the 
existing gap in the literature about what factors might be important in a firm’s decision 
whether to direct R&D expenditure towards product innovation or towards process 
innovations, focusing in the degree of competition market in which firms find 
themselves. 
The present paper extents the idea that the decisions and conditionings of 
firms carrying out some innovation types are not the same, and try to corroborate 
whether both types of innovations are complements or in contrast firms develop one 
type of innovation as an inertia. We focus on the decisions to introduce a new product 
(product innovation) or to introduce new production processes to achieve efficiency 
(process innovation). Product innovation relates to the generation, introduction and 
diffusion of a new product (production process ceteris paribus) while process 
innovation relates to the generation, introduction and diffusion of a new production 
process (product ceteris paribus). An innovation in product leads to a perception as a 
new product by the consumer if any attribute of this product has changes (service, 
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design, packaging, quality). In that case, we are assuming that firm is conducting a 
strategy of product differentiation. 
 When a firm change or improve the process of transforming inputs in outputs, 
it is developing an efficiency strategy since the impact consist of reducing the cost of 
production either being more flexible or increasing the intensity of capital. Both 
decisions can be independent but we may be aware that both innovations may 
happen together. Companies may acquire new technology by purchasing that 
technology embodied in new capital equipment. Thus the capital that embodies the 
technology is a product innovation but the buyer is acquiring a process innovation. We 
check the factors determining both types of innovations as well as their interrelation. 
Our study tries to deep into this relationship and in the investigation of the role of 
manager expertise in the decision innovations. 
3. THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The basic problem of a firm is to maximise its value. The objective is to 
consider the introduction of some research activity as a gain for a better knowledge 
stock and improvements on the probability of developing future innovation 
(Reinganum, 1989; Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen, 1995). The relationship 
between innovation strategy and innovation decision constitutes a production function 
of innovations where the success in some innovation decision depends on the effort 
made by the firm in the past since any innovation strategy has a long term horizon to 
achieve returns (Piergionanni et al., 1997, use also this approach). So, the innovation 
decision will result as a consequence of transforming the knowledge accumulated by 
the firm in the past, the technological opportunities offered by the market, internal 
resources other market characteristics, and the experience of the manager. All the 
hypotheses expressed in the paper are formulated distinguishing the effect of some 
factor in each innovation type, so we expect to find different effects according to 
innovation activity and conditioned to the manager expertise. 
The knowledge stock 
We expect that the technological capital will have a positive impact on the 
innovation activity, since the search effort, which determines the technological capital, 
is intended precisely to be able to improve products and processes. The technological 
knowledge stock captures previous R&D effort done by the firm affected by a 
depreciation rate. We follow Griliches and Mairesse (1984) or Hall (1990) in the sense 
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that search contributes towards the innovation stock by generating a constant stream 
of incremental innovations.  
H1: The accumulated knowledge stock encourages firms to develop some 
innovation activity. 
Technological opportunities of the market 
The idea that not only the monopoly power affect the technological activities of 
firms but the existence of other important environment factors has been summarized 
in Cohen and Levin (1989). Industries with more technological opportunities are 
expected to encourage innovation activity since the accumulated knowledge of the 
market, mostly shared by many of the firms due to spillovers or other effects, reduces 
the cost of translating knowledge into new products and processes. But at the same 
time, it may work against innovation if the innovating firms consider the innovation 
susceptible to be imitated by a rival in a short period of time. It is specially observed in 
the innovation in products (Lunn, 1986). Notice that it captures an externality of R&D 
capital as Crepon and Duguet (1997) pointed out. Piergiovanni, et al. (1997) found out 
that spillovers from university research are a relatively more important source of 
innovation in small firms, while spillovers from industrial research are more important 
in producing innovation in large ones. From all we conclude that the net effect of this 
determinant is uncertain. 
H2: Higher technological opportunities in the market act as barrier to 
imitation leading to increases in the innovation in products. 
Internal Resources 
In the Schumpeterian tradition, the size of the firm has been used as main 
element to test the internal resources. Previous empirical research has tested the 
effect of size on innovation activity (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Kleinknecht, 1989; 
Piergiovanni et al. 1997; Martínez-Ros and Labeaga, 2002) with mixed results but, in 
many of the cases, innovation activity was measured in terms of inputs rather than 
outputs.3 The apparent disarray in obtaining consensus of the effect of firm size on 
innovation activity responds, in many cases, to the omission of many controls of firm 
and market characteristics despite the demonstrated importance of such effects 
                                                        
3Pavitt et al. (1987) found that innovation intensity was greater for large firms and small firms, and 
smaller for medium-sized, in the UK industry. In contrast, Soete (1979) suggested that R&D intensity 
increased with size in a number of sectors in the US. Blundell et al. (1993) using the innovation counts 
found that higher market share firms innovate more, while firms in competitive industries tend to have a 
greater probability to innovate. 
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(Scott, 1984). The size distribution of firms varies across industries, in part because of 
differences in the degree of scale economies in production and distribution. Thus, 
there is a good reason to believe that fixed industry effects are correlated with firm 
size and that the omission of such effects will bias estimates of the effects of size on 
innovation. 
Similarly, firm characteristics such as diversification, financial capability, and 
returns of R&D in larger markets or the existence of more experience in innovation in 
the structure of the organization confirm the positive correlation with large firms 
(Cooper, 1994; Hitt et al. 1990; Graves and Langowitz; 1993; Galende and Suárez, 
1999). So, in order to isolate the size effect on innovation for a given knowledge stock 
is important to control for market competitive conditions and other firm features. For a 
given stock of technological capital and opportunities, the size of the firm may 
influence the output of innovations due, for example, to differences in other physical, 
human and financial resources across firms with different size. In general, a positive 
effect of size on innovation output is expected, since larger firms tend to be less 
financially constrained. However, it may also happen that larger firms view themselves 
as less threatened by competition and lower the rate of innovation in order to not to 
erode profits of current products and processes. Besides, if the firm has monopoly 
profits the incremental profits of innovation will tend to be relatively lower than in a firm 
facing more competition. Moreover, large firms may also be subject to more 
bureaucratic controls and dysfunctions, which may affect negatively their capacity to 
translate capital stock into innovations (Cooper, 1994; Hitt et al. 1990; Collier, 1983; 
Williamson, 1985). 
Cohen and Klepper (1996a, b) developed a model where the main hypothesis 
were that the return of an innovation is positively related with the size of business unit 
and that this relationship is stronger for process innovation than for product 
innovation. Fritsch and Meschede (2001) test the same hypothesis using the different 
kind of R&D expenditure but the findings are not very pronounced. We expose our 
hypotheses in the same line. 
H3: Large firms find more profitable to invest in process innovation than in 
the search of new product innovations. 
The characteristics of the production technology may also affect the decision 
to introduce innovations for a given stock of technological capital; one variable used to 
differentiate production technologies is the intensity of physical capital (KSA). Firms 
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with more capital-intensive technologies will tend to innovate more if, as expected, the 
rents of innovation are less threatened as, to exploit the innovation, high investment in 
physical capital is required. It may also happen that more capital-intensive processes 
provide less room for innovation since they are more automated and rigid. The final 
effect of capital intensity on innovation activity is uncertain. Kraft (1990) included only 
the capital intensity in the product equation obtaining a positive effect, but it is more 
an empirical issue.  
H4: The physical capital is more important in the development of new 
process innovations rather than in the production of new products. 
Industrial Organization factors 
A common market element used in the literature is the market structure. We 
will refer first to the degree of competition in the product market proxied by market 
concentration, which is the typical variable used (see Cohen and Levin, 1989 for a 
complete overview about the relationship between R&D and concentration and an 
extensive discussion about the ambiguous predictions obtained in empirical studies). 
In general, the empirical evidence supports Schumpeter’s arguments that firms in 
concentrated markets can more easily appropriate the returns from inventive activity. 
Others works find evidence that market concentration do not promote R&D because 
the expected incremental innovating rents are larger in competitive markets than 
under monopoly conditions (Arrow, 1962; Bozeman and Link, 1983; Delbono and 
Denicolo, 1998; Yi, 1999). A discussion about the right sign of this variable needs to 
be related to the endogeneity of the measure used in the empirical analysis, i.e. the 
concentration ratio. A positive sign would give support to Schumpeter’s hypothesis 
while a negative sign would be in accordance with Arrow’s predictions. The 
introduction of this variable in both innovation equations also allows us to test for 
different effects of market competition in product and process innovation (Lunn, 1986 
and Kraft, 1990).4 
The discussion above suggests that there are many theoretical issues, which 
will have to be tested empirically in order to determine the sign of the net effect of the 
explanatory variable. The lack of a clear theory also reinforces the importance of 
using econometric estimation procedures that minimise estimation biases. As Levin 
and Reiss (1984) and Levin, Cohen and Mowery (1985) showed, the endogeneity of 
                                                        
4These authors separate process from product innovation and find opposite results. While in Lunn 
(1986), concentration is precisely estimated only in the process equation, Kraft (1990) finds that 
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concentration produces biases in the estimates of the effect over innovation activity. 
Acs and Audretsch (1987) found that large firms are more innovative in concentrated 
industries with high barriers to entry, while smaller firms are more innovative in less 
concentrated industries that are less mature. Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1995) 
obtained innovation activity increases with market share and decrease with market 
concentration. Therefore, in the long run increase in market share may have a net 
negative effect on innovation if it also increases market concentration.  
H5: We expect that the market competition will affect the decisions to 
innovate but the sign of the effect is ambiguous. 
Manager’s ability and firm’s experience 
The RBV offers a good framework to develop the idea that companies are 
heterogeneous in terms of the resources they control. Organizational resources 
consist of all assets, capabilities, attributes and knowledge a firm possesses that 
enable it to develop and implement strategies that improve its performance (Barney, 
1991). A firm’s resources can be a source of competitive advantage in markets when 
it is difficult for the rivals to obtain like resources. Scarce resources create entry 
barriers for firms that do not have them (Wernefelt, 1984). There are two very 
important resources the firm expertise and the ability of the manager in deciding which 
type of innovation is good for the company. Firms with a high experience in 
innovating, develop routines, synergies and capabilities inside the firm among 
departments and employees that the probability to obtain success in this activity 
fosters them to follow innovating. 
However, managers are who take the decisions about the types of innovation. 
As the agency theory suggests, in the utility function of a managers there are two 
components: tangibles and intangibles. The tangible components incorporate 
monetary payments and other non-monetary payments (reducing work time, bonuses, 
etc.). The intangible components include prestige, reputation, image, which will affect 
the incentives of the manager to introduce innovations. The firm does not always 
know both elements. So, we want to separate the motivation of managers to carry out 
innovation activity from the experience effect of a firm in doing the same activity along 
time. 
  The differentiation strategy –changes or improvement product innovations- 
produces more visible effects to the market and hence more incentives at short term 
                                                                                                                                                                  
concentration only has effects in the product equation. 
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to managers to engage in such strategy. The efficiency strategy –changes or some 
improvements in the process- have internal effects that the market is less able to 
observe and evaluate. In that case, managers would have less incentive to carry out 
such innovation. We do not have the possibility to measure that but we can control it 
using methods explained in the empirical analysis below. 
H6: Manager will opt to introduce new products instead of new processes due 
to this last innovation will produce more intangible returns. 
H7: Firms with more experience in developing the same innovation activity will 
encourage following innovating. 
 
4. METHODS 
Sample and Variables 
We use information for manufacturing firms during the sample period 1990-99 
from a survy called ESEE provided by the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Technology. 
Endogenous variables: 
Innovation in product. It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when firm 
involves in the creation of a new product, zero when not. Innovation in process. It is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 when firm introduces some new process innovation 
type, zero when not. Both variables are provided directly by the responsible of filling 
the questionnary to the interviewer. 
Explanatory variables: 
We assume that the knowledge stock is determined by using the specification 
of Griliches and Mairesse (1984) or Hall (1990) and implemented by other authors as 
Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1995) or Martínez-Ros and Labeaga (2002) 
1)1( ???? ititit GSG ?                                                                          [1] 
G evolves according to [1] where Sit is the R&D expenditure of firm i in period t and ?  
is the depreciation rate.5 This search process story implies that the decision about 
                                                        
5We use a depreciation rate of 20 per cent. Small changes in this rate do not significantly affect the 
results presented below. 
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innovating evolves according to the indicator function [1]6. An important issue with the 
knowledge stock is that it can be endogenous.7 To account for it, G will be 
instrumented by its prediction (GINST) constructed regressing G on industry and time 
dummies, firm and market characteristics, and the past knowledge stock under the 
assumption that the error term is uncorrelated. 
Technological opportunities of the market. There are extensive literature that 
capture technological oportunites using the form to appropriate the returns of doing 
innovation. Patents are a good measure of appropriability so we include them in two 
ways. We use two dichotomy variables (REGPATES) and (REGPATEX) which take 
value 1 when firm registers a patent in Spain or in Foreign, respectively. Additionally, 
we include the industries dummies.  
The size of firms will be measured using the logarithm of the number of 
employees at the end of December (LEMP). Since it could be negative effects of size 
on innovation activity we account for them assuming a non-linear relationship between 
size and innovation and we introduce the number of employees squared (EMP2) 
among the explanatory variables of the model (Pavitt, Robson and Townsend, 1987). 
This allows us to identify different size effects at different firm sizes. We use a relative 
measure of size (EVOLCUOT) that takes value 1 when firm considers an 
improvement in its market share. 
We use as a proxy for physical capital (KSA) the ratio of sales to fixed assets 
of the firm and it is constructed using the traditional literature about the measurement 
of capital stock (Blundell et al. 1992).8 A higher value of the ratio means that the 
production process is relatively more capital-intensive. 
We measure the intensity of the market competition (AVGMBE) in an inverse 
way (do in a direct way by doing 1/AVGMBE), by the average gross profit market of 
the industry in order to capture, whether market competition encourages innovation 
activity. With this measure we try to avoid the possible endogeneity bias of the 
concentration variable.  
Managerial ability. We control time invariant firm effects in the models 
estimated using the panel data. The unobserved effects controlled for when using the 
panel nature of the data would be recovering managerial ability (manager’s 
                                                        
6Alternatively, we could assume that the knowledge stock is obtained using number of patents or number 
of innovations as in Blundell et al. (1995). 
7In Martínez-Ros (2000) there is an explanation of this effect. 
8It measures the replacement value of the firm’s machinery capital stock. 
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experience), firm experience in doing R&D activities, or ability in internal organisation, 
which may affect the production of innovations. 
Control variables: 
A characteristic of the market that may affect both innovation activities is the 
growth of demand (Schmookler, 1966). A dummy variable RECES is defined which 
takes the value of 1 when the market of the firm is in a recession and 0 otherwise.  
We expect that a recessive demand discourage the production of whatever innovation 
activity.  
Production processes may also be differentiated in terms of the degree of 
vertical integration (CISP). As firms internalise more activities there are more 
opportunities to innovate, ceteris paribus, and probably there are more incentives to 
do it if the results of innovation can be spread over several activities. Although little 
quantitative work has been done in this area, some case studies suggest the 
presence of economies of scope to R&D in vertically integrated industries. Malerba 
(1985) studied the life cycle of technology in the semiconductor industry and found 
that the advantages of vertical integration for innovative activity had varied along the 
cycle. CISP is measured, inversely, by the ratio of purchases to other firms divided by 
the total value of production, both variables defined in a yearly basis. 
We also consider possible discipline effects of conducting export activities. We 
define a dummy variable (DEXP), which takes the value of 1 when the firm exports 
and 0 otherwise (in any period or in all periods. We expect that doing exports favour 
at least product innovation, as their presence in foreign markets may require more 
innovations in order to be competitive. But it is also true that firms with more 
innovation activity may have more incentives to export since they also have more 
intangible resources to sustain growth. So, no clear direction of the causality may be 
established. 
Foreign ownership is a dummy variable (CAPEXT) to indicate whether firm is 
controlled by 50 per cent or more. This is a control variable for which no clear sign can 
be expected from the theory. However, depending of the origin of the external capital 
we expect a positive effect at least in the process innovation equation. This variable 
also tries to proxy a disciplinary effect of competitiveness. 
Finally, we control possible shocks common to all industries using time 
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dummies, as well as time invariant industry shocks. 
Methodology 
Before presenting the empirical specifications we are interesting in estimating, 
our first task consist in an extensive descriptive analysis of the frequencies of both 
innovation activities, conditioning on past events but unconditional to other possible 
determinants. Figures presented in Table 1 try to shed some light into the persistence 
of the activities at the firm level. We calculate the probability of doing product or 
process innovation for each firm in the current period and whenever they have 
conducted previously these activities. The first block in the table shows the probability 
of making some product innovation. The first column present the unconditional 
probabilities for the period 1991-99. Columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide the product 
innovation frequencies in t given the firms also made some product innovation in t – 1, 
t – 2, t – 3, and t – 4, respectively. When calculating all these frequencies for every 
period, we also try to show possible business cycle effects. The jumps from 
unconditional to conditional probabilities range from 117 to 168 per cent. In other 
words, while the percent of non-innovating firms in 1991 is more than 70 per cent, 
they reduce to 40 per cent among those firms doing product innovation in 1990. 
Experience of firms in developing this activity in the recent past seem to be a good 
predictor of current innovation frequencies. We summarize the information in Table 1 
in Figure 1. 
The increases in innovation frequencies when we extend the conditioning set 
to additional past events are not as espectacular as before. For instance, the 
innovating frequency in 1992 for firms innovating both in 1990 and 1991 is 69 percent, 
which must be compared with the unconditional frequency of 65 percent. On the other 
hand, these last figures are much less affected by cycle effects. It seems that once a 
firm has incurred in some sunk costs (development of an R&D unit, acquisition of 
capital, etc.) the continuation of these activities is less costly. Another message we 
can extract is that innovation is an activity that requires some experience and once a 
firm has acquired it, there is a significant reduction in the probabilities of moving out. 
The contribution to increases and decreases come from firms without experience who 
are continuously taking entry and exit decisions. This simple exercise poses some 
confidence about the fulfillment of H7 in the product innovation decision. 
The second block in Table 1 presents the probabilities of making process 
innovation. Again, we report unconditional and conditional probabilities. The first 
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column present the unconditional probabilities for 9 years of the sample. Columns 2, 
3, 4 and 5 provide the process innovation frequencies in t given firms also made some 
process innovation in t – 1, t – 2, t – 3, and t – 4, respectively. The unconditional 
probabilities seem to be more affected by the business cycle than those of product 
innovation. The recession began at the end of 1991 and there is a big decrease in the 
frequency of developing new processes than in conducting product innovations. The 
level of innovation got by firms during the early ninetines, again recovers after 1996 
when the economy began a new boom. The increases in the conditional probabilities 
are not as big as in the case of product innovations, because the point of departure is 
different. However, the implications from these figures are again that experience of 
firms in developing process innovations in the recent past seem to corretly predict 
current innovation frequencies. We present in Figure 1 the unconditional and 
conditional probabilities. 
When extending the conditioning set to previous events we get the same 
picture as before. The innovating frequency in 1992 for firms innovating both in 1990 
and 1991 is 68 percent, which must be compared with the conditional frequency of 
only doing innovation in 1991 of 64 percent. The preliminary implications from all 
these figures is that recent previous experience strongly conditions current 
performance. Again, cycle effects are affecting less the change in the decisions of 
firms already innovating. Although with the caution that we do not include additional 
conditionings, this descriptive statistics allows us to confirm H7 in the process 
innovation decision. 
The second exercise we make consist in deriving an specification for the 
production of innovations, having in mind that we only observe whether the decisions 
are taken or not. In these circumstances, discrete choice models for the two indicators 
seem to be adequate. The specification proposed is: 
Probability (Innovate) = f (explanatory variables, control variables, time 
dummies, industry dummies) 
where all variables in f(.) are expressed in t-1. In cases where we exploit the full 
nature of the panel, we also include in the previous specification the individual non-
time variant effects, which can approximate firm effects associated to manager´s 
expertise or ability. In order to test the different hypotheses we posed in section 3, we 
estimate three different static models. The first estimation is done on the whole 
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sample and it uses the pooled data. This means that we do not control for different 
effects across firms. The second model is just a probit on the pooled data, but it is 
estimated on the sub-sample of firms innovating in the recent past (last year). So the 
equation is: 
Probability (Innovate t / Firm innovating t - 1) = f (explanatory variables, control 
variables, time dummies, industry dummies) 
which allows us to test whether persistence in conducting innovation activities has any 
effect on the rest of conditionings. The third model allows for firm specific differences 
according to a common distribution, i.e., discrete choice random effects model. The 
effects of controlling individual heterogeneity on the two equations (product and 
process innovation decisions) serve as a proxy for testing H6. We also estimate the 
same three specifications with the inclusion of the lagged indicator in order to put 
more confidence on the likelihood of the tests for H6 and H7. 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In Table 2 we present the naïve estimates corresponding to pooled probit 
models with the two different samples mentioned. In Table 3 we present the 
unconditional and conditional random effect probit models. Finally, Table 4 shows the 
coefficients of dynamic random effects probit models with the lagged indicator of the 
own and alternative innovation decisions included. Comparisons among unconditional 
and conditional coefficients within the same table provides us a first test on H7. 
It seems that H7 is confirmed when looking at results in Table 1. Once we use 
the sample on past innovators, most of the conditionings loss their significance. But, 
we must be cautious because we miss differences amongst firms in these 
specifications. Comparisons among coefficients in Table 2 seem to confirm previous 
evidence, with more emphasis in the process innovation equation, being the control of 
heterogeneity among firms more important for product development, thus confirming 
H6. Comparisons of equivalent models across tables inform about the relative 
importance of both effects. Finally, it is more important having experience in 
innovating in product for the success of future product innovations and having 
experience in innovating in process for the success of future process innovations, but 
columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 also point out some complementarities between both 
activities. However, this is due to spurious correlation because one we introduce the 
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own lagged indicator, the significance of the alternative vanishes.  
On the other hand, it is important to test the significance of some variables in 
determining innovation frequencies, even after controlling for persistence and ability. 
In other words, we try to confirm the hypotheses established in section 3 above. H1 
emphasize the importance of doing past innovations and, as a result, once experience 
is controlled for either estimating the model in the sub-sample of firms innovating in 
the recent past or including lagged innovation indicators, the accummulated 
knowledge stock lacks its significance almost everywhere. 
Knowledge stock and technolgical opportunities get the expected estimates 
confirming our hypoteses. When firm accumulates knowledge, it serves and 
encourages itselve to be on innovating. And it is true for both decisions. Having 
registered patents in the own country incentives continuing the development of both 
innovation activities but with more intensive in the product innovation decision since 
patents is a barrier and a protection from imitation. 
As regards H3, the evidence we find is very interesting. First, there is a 
quadratic effect of size in the decision to carry out product innovation. Both small and 
large firms innovate more in product than medium sized firms. On the other hand, for 
developing process innovation size seems to play a crucial role, independently of the 
controls we include in the specifications. However, once we condition on the existence 
of past innovations, size becomes irrelevant in explaining current innovation 
decisions. 
We also find several very robust results. First, exports and innovation 
decisions are highly positively correlated. It seems that competition in foreign markets 
induce a higher propensity to make both innovation activities. Second, the physical 
capital is more important in the development of process rather than product 
innovation, thus confirming H4.  
Control of the ability of the manager seems to have some effect on the 
determinants of innovation, but it is anyway less important than the effect of previous 
experience. We must note, however that heterogeneity could be correlated with some 
of the explanatory variables since more skills implies more propensity to innovate, but 
in order to continue innovating firms need to devote more resources. These feedback 
effects induce correlation among skills and input variables. 
In those models where we include lagged innovation indicators as proxies for 
experience, the results are similar to those where we estimate on the subsample of 
 17
firms innovating in the recent past. However, some differences need to be 
emphasized and clarified. These differences arise because of several reasons. First, 
we loose almost 60 percent of the observations when conditioning on past events. 
Second, given these cut in sample size 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have estimated in this paper several alternatives of discrete choice models 
for panel data, using a Spanish survey, the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias 
Empresariales for the period 1990-99. Preliminary evidence indicates that in the 
decisions to carry out innovations, there are different determinants (or effects) in the 
two equations. In fact, we find that experience or persistence in doing these activities 
is important, whereas other conditionings remain as crucial determinants of the 
innovation frequencies even after controlling for experience. Ability of the manager, as 
proxy by firm specific time invariant effects is another factor influencing the firm´s 
performance. However, we test several hypotheses and we can conclude that even in 
an environment of managers with high propensities to innovate and firms developing 
experience in conducting these activities, some particular characteristics are needed 
in order to have success in the innovation policy. Although the past of the innovation 
activities in the firm (firm experience) and the unobserved heterogeneity (manager 
ability) are very important determinants of the decisions we model, the internal and 
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Table 1. Unconditional and conditional Innovation Frequences 
 iprod iprodt1 Iprodt2 iprodt2t1 iprodt3 iprodt3t1 iprodt4 
z90 0,187      
z91 0,271 0,589     
z92 0,271 0,644 0,529 0,715   
z93 0,258 0,627 0,594 0,718 0,487 0,786 
z94 0,269 0,665 0,58 0,746 0,541 0,754 0,5 
z95 0,255 0,628 0,583 0,734 0,553 0,785 0,521 
z96 0,266 0,714 0,605 0,801 0,583 0,846 0,534 
z97 0,274 0,699 0,652 0,774 0,605 0,839 0,554 
z98 0,271 0,672 0,617 0,744 0,585 0,778 0,577 
z99 0,274 0,692 0,589 0,759 0,588 0,835 0,574 
 
 iproc iproct1 iproct2 iproct2t1 iproct3 iproct3t1 iproct4 
z90 0,18      
z91 0,364 0,62     
z92 0,339 0,65 0,517 0,69   
z93 0,333 0,65 0,583 0,731 0,507 0,798 
z94 0,345 0,642 0,548 0,683 0,531 0,717 0,504
z95 0,337 0,641 0,566 0,718 0,524 0,759 0,533
z96 0,333 0,666 0,547 0,728 0,522 0,77 0,491
z97 0,359 0,71 0,615 0,796 0,547 0,827 0,542
z98 0,379 0,723 0,635 0,77 0,61 0,818 0,56
z99 0,352 0,654 0,575 0,698 0,556 0,761 0,55
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Table 2. Innovation Decisions1, 2, 3 
 Unconditional Probit Conditional Probit 
 IPROD IPROC IPROD IPROC 
Intercept -0.746 (2.27) -1.519 (4.78) 0.443 (0.78) -0.534 (0.99) 
KSA 0.182 (2.07) 0.813 (7.26) 0.091 (0.51) -0.040 (0.38) 
EXPORT 0.388 (12.3) 0.183 (6.17) 0.289 (4.70) 0.086 (1.60) 
AVGMBE 0.007(1.32) -0.002 (0.37) 0.010 (1.15) -0.004 (0.50) 
G 1.946 (7.00) 1.187 (4.24) 0.984 (1.81) 0.653 (1.21) 
SIZE 0.033 (0.70) 0.188 (4.09) -0.011 (0.14) 0.112 (1.39) 
SIZE2 0.018 (3.69) -0.000 (0.09) 0.011 (1.35) 0.005 (0.65) 
EVOLCUOT 0.149 (5.45) 0.224 (8.65) 0.037 (0.76) 0.160 (3.64) 
REGPATES 0.468 (8.65) 0.272 (5.07) 0.170 (2.16) 0.155 (1.92) 
REGPATEX 0.288 (4.18) 0.051 (0.74) 0.138 (1.39) 0.036 (0.36) 
RECES 0.025 (0.82) -0.049 (1.63) 0.102 (1.76) -0.013 (0.24) 
CAPEXT -0.044 (1.31) 0.008 (0.30) -0.096 (1.64) 0.047 (0.90) 
CISP -0.002 (0.41) 0.003 (0.68) -0.009 (0.97) 0.006 (0.73) 
LR4 6877.21 (37) 7775.50 (37) 2089.73 (37) 2654.47 (37) 
Notes. 
1. Sample sizes are 13225 observations in the unconditional models and 3464 and 4420 
observations in the conditional product and process innovation equations. 
2. In all specifications we include additional controls as time and industry dummies, the 
knowledge stock and spillovers indicator. 
3. T-statistics (in absolute value) are in parenthesis. 










 IPROD IPROC IPROD IPROC 
Intercept -1.192 (2.48) -1.711 (4.04) 0.633 (0.93) -0.426 (0.71) 
KSA 0.307 (2.57) 0.571 (4.32) 0.146 (0.66) -0.039 (0.33) 
EXPORT 0.313 (5.64) 0.167 (3.58) 0.260 (3.27) 0.079 (1.24) 
AVGMBE 0.008 (1.20) -0.001 (0.26) 0.017 (1.60) -0.003 (0.38) 
G 1.039 (2.46) 0.760 (1.87) 1.040 (1.49) 0.602 (0.94) 
SIZE 0.006 (0.06) 0.223 (2.54) 0.011 (0.10) 0.090 (0.92) 
SIZE2 0.026 (2.40) 0.003 (0.34) 0.013 (1.14) 0.009 (0.91) 
EVOLCUO 0.076 (2.00) 0.143 (4.28) 0.021 (0.36) 0.160 (3.26) 
REGPAT 0.349 (4.66) 0.230 (3.26) 0.203 (2.13) 0.183 (1.99) 
REGPATX 0.201 (2.13) 0.042 (0.46) 0.101 (0.85) 0.052 (0.45) 
RECES 0.029 (0.67) -0.068 (1.78) 0.156 (2.25) -0.017 (0.29) 
CAPEXT 0.017 (0.25) 0.044 (0.76) -0.098 (1.25) 0.067 (1.05) 
CISP -0.004 (0.59) 0.003 (0.54) -0.015 (1.38) 0.005 (0.58) 
LR4 5867.36 (37) 7002.34 (37) 2039.97 (37) 2628.48 (37) 
Notes. 
1. Sample sizes are 13225 observations in the unconditional models and 3464 
and 4420 observations in the conditional product and process innovation 
equations. 
2. In all specifications we include additional controls as time and industry 
dummies, the knowledge stock and spillovers indicator. 
3. T-statistics (in absolute value) are in parenthesis. 




Table 4. Innovation decisions1, 2, 3 
 
Dynamic Random Effects Probit 
(own lag) 
Dynamic Random Effects Probit 
(alternative lag) 
 IPROD IPROC IPROD IPROC 
Intercept -1.238 (2.89) -1.437 (3.79) -1.106 (2.32) -1.809 (4.32) 
IPROD(-1) 0.984 (24.4)   0.357 (9.65) 
IPROC(-1)  0.896 (25.8) 0.279 (7.45)  
KSA 0.200 (1.79) 0.279 (2.22) 0.239 (2.00) 0.548 (4.15) 
EXPORT 0.275 (6.01) 0.137 (3.49) 0.300 (5.45) 0.141 (3.08) 
AVGMBE 0.005 (0.85) 0.001 (0.25) 0.009 (1.32) -0.002 (0.37) 
SIZE 0.020 (0.27) 0.165 (2.48) -0.008 (0.08) 0.234 (2.75) 
SIZE2 0.015 (1.88) 0.000 (0.01) 0.025 (2.34) 0.000 (0.01) 
EVOLCUO 0.068 (1.96) 0.150 (4.82) 0.068 (1.82) 0.137 (4.10) 
REGPAT 0.240 (3.50) 0.170 (2.63) 0.335 (4.50) 0.174 (2.48) 
REGPATX 0.228 (2.62) 0.041 (0.50) 0.203 (2.16) 0.032 (0.36) 
RECES 0.014 (0.35) -0.063 (1.78) 0.026 (0.60) -0.071 (1.86) 
CAPEXT -0.026 (0.49) 0.022 (0.47) 0.019 (0.28) 0.037 (0.65) 
CISP -0.002 (0.29) -0.000 (0.01) -0.004 (0.71) 0.004 (0.62) 
LR4 5589.28 (38) 6687.97 (38) 5839.68 (38) 6956.09 (38) 
Notes. 
1. Sample sizes are 13225 observations in all models. 
2. In all specifications we include additional controls as time and industry dummies, the 
knowledge stock and spillovers indicator. 
3. T-statistics (in absolute value) are in parenthesis. 
4. LR is the likelihood ratio test (degrees of freedom in parenthesis). 
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 The database is provided by the Spanish Industry and Energy Ministry and 
involves approximately 18000 firms followed along the period 1990-99 and belonging 
to the manufacturing sector. The sample we use consists in aproximatedly 1000 firms 
that have provided information in the full period. In that sense, we have a complete 
panel data. The descriptive statistics of the main variables are in Table A.1.  
 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
 PRODUCT INNOVATION PROCESS INNOVATION 
 MEAN STD. DEV. MEAN STD. DEV. 
G 0.025 0.048 0.020 0.042 
EXPORT 0.764 0.425 0.711 0.453 
KSA 0.046 0.131 0.061 0.171 
CAPEXT 0.304 0.460 0.303 0.459 
SIZE 4.824 1.635 4.819 1.594 
AVGMBE 2.455 14.781 1.377 15.111 
RECES 0.232 0.422 0.216 0.412 
EVOLCUOT 0.369 0.483 0.375 0.484 
CISP 64.255 15.08 63.204 15.806 
REGPATES 0.147 0.354 0.107 0.310 
REGPATEX 0.093 0.291 0.068 0.251 
Observations1 4701(26 %) 6008 (33.23%) 
Notes. 
1. Sample in each innovation type corresponds to the observations in the period 1990-1999. 
In brackets are expressed the percentage over the total number of observations. 
 
 
